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Abstract: This article argues that interorganizational trust is a crucial but 
understudied topic in public administration research. It consolidates the relevant 
literature and identifies the conceptual building blocks that are required to study 
interorganizational trust and distrust as specific phenomena in public administration. 
The authors argue that both trust and distrust can be considered to have certain 
functionalities and dysfunctionalities for interorganizational interactions in public 
administration, and discuss the dimensions and sources of interorganizational trust 
and distrust in such interactions. The article consolidates these discussions in the 
concept of ‘administrational trust’, which is defined as “a subjective evaluation made 
by boundary spanners regarding their intentional and behavioral suspension of 
vulnerability on the basis of expectations of a trustee organization in particular 
interorganizational interactions in public administration”. The authors construct and 
present a framework for analysis of the mechanisms of administrational trust and 
distrust, and argue that it also allows the development of management strategies to 
optimize interorganizational trust-distrust distributions in order to facilitate, solidify 
and increase the performance of interorganizational cooperation in public 
administration. 
Keywords: Interorganizational cooperation; public administration; interorganizational 
trust and distrust; administrational trust and distrust. 
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1. Introduction  
In 1979, Niklas Luhmann (1979, p. 8) wrote that there was a “regrettably sparse 
literature which has trust as its main theme”. However, by the end of the 1990’s, his 
lament lost a significant amount of its validity (Kramer, 1999). The social, political 
and economic realities of an increasingly interdependent and global world (Cook, 
2001) led to a surge of scholarly attention for trust, which became increasingly 
recognized as an important factor for inter- and intra- organizational relationships in 
the private sector over the past two decades (Bijlsma-Frankema & Costa, 2005).  
Political scientists and public administration scholars appear to be mainly interested 
in the topics of social trust in societies and societal trust in government. These topics 
have been studied extensively in well-known contributions to these fields (for 
example Putnam, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995; Uslaner, 2002). Bouckaert (2012) 
identifies T1 (societal trust in public administration), T2 (public administration trust in 
society) and T3 (trust within public administration) as three relevant trust research 
orientations for public administration, and argues that the two latter orientations 
receive much less attention than the former. For instance, Yang (2005) studies 
public administrator’s trust in citizens, but his work is a rare exception in that respect. 
Nyhan (2000) discusses the internal organizational perspective of trust within public 
administration, but a real focus on interorganizational trust within public 
administration remains a topic of scarce interest for public administration scholars to 
date (Choudhury, 2008; Klijn, Edelenbos & Steijn, 2010). This scarce attention is 
peculiar considering the (political) discourse surrounding public management and 
organizational research in the private sector. According to Choudhury (2008), 
citizens and reformers alike have seemingly started to consider trust to be both a 
necessary goal as well as a means for effective administration. In this article we 
address this gap in the existing literature through a comprehensive discussion of 
interorganizational trust in public administration, and provide an analytical framework 
that can be used to study and manage such trust effectively. 
1.1. Why focus on interorganizational trust in public administration 
research? 
Despite the scarce research attention for the topic, interorganizational trust is often 
argued to be an important concept for contemporary public administration. In his 
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treatise on the future of public administration, Dwight Waldo (1980, p. 187) argued 
that public administration is subject to increasing complexity because it is given 
responsibilities “beyond the virtue and authority [it] can summon”. As the complexity 
of public governance grows, single organizations quickly reach the boundaries of 
their rationality and bureaucratic inflation renders organizations increasingly 
cumbersome (Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007), which inhibits their capacity to cope with the 
policy challenges of modern society. Scholars have argued that ‘governance’ ideas 
emerged in the discourse of public sector reform in order to cope with this rising 
complexity (Pierre & Ingraham, 2010; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Organizational 
specialization, chains of design and planning and cooperation in networks are central 
strategies to deal with individual bounded rationality and achieve composite 
decisions and policy objectives in these complex contexts (Simon, 1997; Lane & 
Bachmann, 1998; Miles & Snow, 1986; Pierre & Ingraham, 2010). Full reliance on 
hierarchical steering on the one hand and the free market on the other hand are 
considered to be outmoded as effective management strategies (Loorbach, 2010, p.  
162), and loosely coupled networks of public governance actors are proposed as a 
potential alternative. Authors such as Shaw (2003), Getha-Taylor (2012) and 
Agranoff (2013) argue that (interorganizational) trust is a very important factor for 
successful (co-)operation in such networked contexts. Edelenbos and Klijn (2007) 
argue that trust facilitates, solidifies and increases the performance of 
interorganizational cooperation in complex decision-making networks. 
However, scholars treat the concept of ‘trust’ critically in public administration. 
Bouckaert (2012) warns that trust should not be considered as a panacea for reform, 
since an overabundance of trust is as damaging as too little trust for public 
administration. Van Montfort (2010) similarly argues that trust is often used as a 
mantra in reform rhetoric, potentially veiling and obstructing serious debate about 
mechanisms such as oversight, accountability and the organization of checks and 
balances in public administration. Furthermore, it remains unclear how insights from 
private sector research might be transferred to the public sector, as the political 
nature of public administration’s ‘sponsor’ might set it apart from the private sector in 
significant ways (Niskanen, 1971). It is therefore essential to understand 
interorganizational trust better in the context of public administration as currently, it 
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remains unclear to which extent conclusions of private sector interorganizational 
trust research also hold for public administration, and whether there is room for a 
‘trust paradigm’ in the public sector.  
In what follows, we will build and present a conceptual and analytical framework to 
guide empirical analysis of interorganizational trust and distrust in the context of 
public administration. We first discuss the conceptual nature of trust. Second, we 
consider the role of interorganizational trust and explore it in the context of public 
administration. Third, we discuss the distribution of interorganizational trust and 
distrust in complex interactions. Fourth, we focus on the ‘organizational’ nature of 
interorganizational trust and distrust. Fifth, we discuss the sources of 
interorganizational trust and distrust and finally, we consolidate our discussion in the 
overarching concept of ‘administrational trust’ and present and discuss the resulting 
analytical framework. 
2. Towards a conceptual framework for interorganizational trust in public 
administration 
2.1. What is trust? 
An extensive and expanding body of literature has generated numerous definitions of 
trust over the years. However, the multidisciplinary research community did not 
succeed in formulating a comprehensive theory of interorganizational trust as of yet 
(McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011). Lewicki and Brinsfield (2011) noted that each discipline 
still tends to focus on aspects of trust that are consistent with its own dominant 
theoretical paradigms. Although trust is now one of the most frequently used social 
science concepts (Das & Teng, 2004), the detached accumulation of trust research 
has led to “a conceptual morass” (Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992, p.  473) that remains 
daunting after two decades of trust research (Nooteboom, 2006). Table 1 gives an 
overview of the wide range of such trust definitions. 
Table 1: An overview of trust definitions 
Authors Discipline Definitions 
Bachmann & 
Inkpen (2011) 
Sociology The decision of one party to rely on another party under conditions of 
risk. The trustor permits his or her fate to be determined by the trustee 
and risks that he or she will experience negative outcome, i.e. injury or 
loss, if the trustee proves untrustworthy.  
Braithwaite & Levi 
(1998) 
Social psychology A relationship between actors or groups in which one party adopts the 
position, expressed either verbally or behaviorally, that the other will 
pursue a course of action that is considered preferable to alternative 
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courses of action. 
Bromily & Harris 
(2006) 
Organization 
studies 
One’s non-calculative belief in another’s honesty in negotiations, good-
faith efforts to keep commitments, and forbearance from opportunism. 
Carnevale & 
Wechsler (1992)  
Public 
administration 
A faith in people, their motivations, and their capacities. 
Coleman (1990)  Sociology Situations in which the risk one takes depends on the performance of 
another actor. 
(Choudhury 
(2008)  
Public 
administration 
A voluntary act that is based on a psychological state of positive 
expectation in the face of vulnerability and risk. 
(Currall & Judge 
(1995)  
Social psychology An individual’s behavioral reliance on another person under a condition 
of risk. 
Das & Teng 
(2001) 
Organization 
studies 
Positive expectations regarding the other in a risky situation. 
Dasgupta (1988)  Economics Expectations about the actions of other people that have a bearing on 
one’s own choice of action when that action must be chosen before one 
can monitor the actions of those others. 
Deakin & Michie 
(1997)  
Management One is willing to assume an open and vulnerable position. One expects 
the other actor to refrain from opportunistic behavior even if the 
opportunity for it arises without having any guarantee that the other 
party will indeed act as expected. 
Gambetta (1988)  Sociology A particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent 
assesses another agent or group of agents will perform a particular 
action. When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, 
we implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action that 
is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to 
consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him. 
Gamson (1968)  Political science The probability that the political system will produce preferred 
outcomes even if it is left untended. 
Giddens (1990)  Sociology The confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a 
given set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a 
faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract 
principles. 
Grey & Garsten, 
(2001)  
Management A precarious social accomplishment enacted through the interplay of 
social or discursive structures, including those of work organizations, 
and individuated subjects. 
(Hardin, 2002)  Political science A form of encapsulated interest. A trusts B because he or she 
presumes it is in B’s interest to act in a way consistent with A’s interest. 
Hosmer (1995)  Sociology An expectation by one [entity] of ethically justifiable behavior—that is, 
morally correct decisions and actions based upon ethical principles of 
analysis—on the part of the other [entity] in a joint endeavor or 
economic exchange. 
Khodyakov 
(2007)  
Sociology Trustworthy relationships make people vulnerable to the behavior of 
their colleagues, who are expected, but not obliged, to act in the best 
interest of the organization. 
Klijn, Edelenbos, 
& Steijn (2010)  
Public 
administration 
A stable positive expectation that actor A has (or predicts he has) of the 
intentions and motives of actor B in refraining from opportunistic 
behavior, even if the opportunity arises (Edelenbos and  Klijn, 2007). 
Trust is based on the expectation that actor A will take the interests of 
actor B into account. 
Lewis & Weigert 
(1985)  
Sociology The belief held by members of a social system that allows them to act 
according to and feel secure in the expected futures constituted by the 
presence of each other or their symbolic representations. 
Lewicki, McAllister 
& Bies (1998)  
Social psychology Trust is defined in terms of confident positive expectations regarding 
another’s conduct, and distrust is defined in terms of confident negative 
expectations regarding another’s conduct. 
Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman 
(1995)  
Social psychology The willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another 
party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or 
control that other party. 
McAllister (1995)  Social psychology The extent to which a person is confident in, and willing to act on the 
basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another. 
Misztal (1996)  Sociology To believe that results of someone’s intended action will be appropriate 
from our point of view. 
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Möllering (2001)  Sociology A state of favorable expectation regarding other people’s actions and 
intentions, as such it is seen as the basis for individual risk-taking 
behavior, co-operation, reduced social complexity, order, social capital 
and so on. 
Möllering (2006)  Sociology A reflexive process building on reason, routine and reflexivity, 
suspending irreducible social vulnerability and uncertainty as if they 
were favorably resolved, and maintaining a state of favorable 
expectation towards the actions and intentions of more or less specific 
others. 
Nooteboom 
(2006)  
Economics The expectation that a partner will not engage in opportunistic behavior, 
even in the face of opportunities and incentives for opportunism.  
Ostrom (1998)  Economics The expectation of one person about the actions of others that affects 
the first person’s choice, when actions must be taken before the actions 
of others are known (adapted from Dasgupta). 
Parsons (1970)  Sociology The attitudinal ground- in affectively motivated loyalty- for acceptance 
of solidary relationships. 
Ring & Van de 
Ven (1994)  
Management Faith in the moral integrity or goodwill of other, which is produced 
through interpersonal interactions that lead to social-psychological 
bonds of mutual norms, sentiments, and friendships. 
Rotter (1967)  Psychology An expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, 
or verbal or written statement of another individual or group can be 
relied on. 
Rousseau, Sitkin, 
Burt & Camerer  
(1998)  
Social psychology A psychological state comprising the intention to accept vulnerability 
based on positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another. 
Sztompka (1998)  Sociology A bet on the future contingent actions of others. 
Williamson 
(1993)  
Economics Trust is warranted when the expected gain from placing oneself at risk 
to another is positive, but not otherwise. 
Zand (1972)  Sociology Increasing vulnerability to another whose behavior is not under one’s 
control in a situation in which the penalty one suffers if the other abuses 
that vulnerability is greater than the benefit one gains if the other does 
not abuse that vulnerability. 
Zaheer, McEvily, 
& Perrone (1998)  
Organization 
studies 
The expectation that an actor (1) can be relied on to fulfill obligations 
(2) will behave in a predictable manner and (3) will act and negotiate 
fairly when the possibility for opportunism is present. 
Zucker (1986)  Sociology A set of expectations shared by all those involved in an exchange. 
 
This overview illustrates the span of trust definitions quite clearly. It allows us to 
crystallize that trust stems from both cognition and affection (McAllister, 1995), is 
required in risky or contingent situations (Luhmann, 1979; Das & Teng, 2001), is 
characterized by a willingness to be vulnerable (Currall & Judge, 1995), leads to risk-
taking behavior (Lewis & Weigert, 1985) and is based on positive expectations of a 
counterpart (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995). As such, we will define trust as “the 
intentional and behavioral suspension of vulnerability by a trustor on the basis of 
positive expectations of a trustee”. 
In the following paragraphs, this table is used as the anchor for a discussion of the 
dimensions, the role, the distribution, the organizational nature and the sources of 
interorganizational trust in public administration. 
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2.2. Dimensions of trust 
First, some of the definitions refer to trust as an expectation, others conceptualize 
trust as an attitude and still others formulate trust as behavior. Therefore, some 
authors have argued that the phenomenon of trust has multiple dimensions (McEvily 
& Tortoriello, 2011; Lewis & Weigert, 1985). The first dimension of trust is often 
discussed as the trustor’s perception of the trustworthiness of the trustee, which is 
argued to consist of positive expectations of the trustee’s ability, benevolence and 
integrity in a specific relation (Colquitt, Scott & Lepine, 2007; Dietz, 2011; Li, 2011). 
Ability refers to the perceived skills, competences and other characteristics that allow 
the trustee to have influence in some domain. Benevolence is the belief that the 
trustee wants to do good for reasons that are not completely egocentric, and integrity 
refers to the belief that the trustee adheres to a set of values and principles that are 
acceptable to the trustor (Mayer et al., 1995). The dimension of perceived 
trustworthiness therefore refers to the trustors’ expectations about the trustee 
regarding these characteristics. 
On the basis of their perceptions about the trustworthiness of a trustee, trustors can 
suspend the existing unpredictability, ambiguity and complexity in interactions, 
encouraging their willingness to accept vulnerability in a certain relation (Edelenbos 
& Klijn, 2007; Zucker, 1986). This is the second dimension of trust. The trustor 
makes a ‘leap of faith’ on the basis of incomplete information through which risk and 
vulnerability are suspended (Möllering, 2006). This vulnerability is derived from 
“uncertainty regarding the motives, intentions, and prospective actions of others on 
whom [actors] depend” (Kramer, 1999, p.  571). The notion of suspension means 
that a trusting actor is never sure whether he is making the right choice or not. A 
trusting actor knows that uncertainty, vulnerability and risk are present, but suspends 
this knowledge on the basis of good reasons “as if it were favorably resolved” 
(Möllering, 2006, p. 115). A trustor suspends vulnerability, not because they don’t 
know it is present, but because they have good reasons to believe that the trustee 
will not abuse the suspended vulnerability. 
There is a third dimension of trust that needs to be taken into account as it has been 
argued that “trust is only involved when the trusting expectation makes a difference 
to a decision; otherwise what we have is a simple hope” (Luhmann, 1979, p. 24). 
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Lewis and Weigert (1985, p. 971) note that “the practical significance of trust lies in 
the social action it underwrites”. Behavioral trust can therefore be seen as 
observable risk-taking behavior in a relational exchange process. As Currall and 
Judge (1995) explain, such behavior can result from a trustor’ s willingness to accept 
vulnerability, but this is not necessarily the case. Risk-taking behavior can also be 
present in the absence of willingness to take risks (such as when risk-taking 
behavior is enforced by regulations), or it can be absent in the presence of 
willingness to take risk (such as when risk-taking behavior is forbidden or obstructed 
by regulations). 
Trust is argued to be a reciprocal and self-reinforcing phenomenon because these 
three dimensions are argued to be interrelated. First, trust is considered to be self-
reinforcing because actors who perceive their counterpart to be trustworthy will be 
more willing to suspend their vulnerability and take observable risks in relationships, 
which generates relational information on the basis of which they update their 
perceptions of the ability, benevolence and integrity of the trustee (Mayer et al., 
1995). This argument explains the emergence of virtuous cycles of trust and vicious 
cycles of distrust (Vlaar, Van den Bosch & Volberda, 2007; Zand, 1972). Second, 
trust is argued to be reciprocal because the risk-taking behavior of actor A can be 
interpreted by actor B as a relational signal of A’s trustworthiness (Ostrom & Walker, 
2003). These self-reinforcing and reciprocal dynamics between the dimensions of 
trust are illustrated in the following figure. 
Figure 1: The reciprocal and self-reinforcing nature of (dis)trust in interactions 
Leap of faith:
Intended suspension
of vulnerability
Feedback on beliefs based on experience
Perceived
trustworthiness of B
Leap of faith:
Intended suspension
of vulnerability
Behavioural trust:
Observable
risk-taking
Feedback on beliefs based on experience
Perceived
trustworthiness of A
Behavioural trust:
Observable
risk-taking
Actor A
Actor B
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Discussions of trust are often confounding and fail to distinguish the different 
dimensions of the concept (Hardin, 2001). A comprehensive framework of trust 
should therefore allow analysis of perceived trustworthiness, suspension of 
vulnerability and behavioral trust (Das & Teng, 2004; McEvily & Tortoriello, 2011; 
Mayer et al., 1995).  
2.3. Role of trust and distrust in public administration 
 A meta-analysis of trust research conducted by Fulmer and Gelfand (2012) shows 
that empirical research focuses mainly on the positive role of trust and the negative 
role of distrust in relations. In our introduction, we argued that trust is increasingly 
important in public administration because increasingly complex public problems 
transgress the boundaries of single organizations’ rationality, therefore requiring 
cooperation and ‘governance’. In this paragraph, we argue more elaborately why 
interorganizational trust is considered to be functional in public administration. 
However, we also argue that the same argument can be made for interorganizational 
distrust. Van de Walle (2011) for instance, has argued that New Public Management 
might be considered to have attempted to strengthen citizen trust in public 
administration (T1) by introducing institutionalized interorganizational distrust (T3) in 
the public sector through contracts, fragmentation, short-term explicit standards of 
performance and audit and control mechanisms (Dubnick, 2005). In recent reform 
initiatives, strict administrative procedures and controls are considered as 
instruments to increase the accountability and transparency of administrations 
towards citizens (Berg 2005). Both interorganizational trust and distrust can be 
associated with functionalities and dysfunctionalities for  public administration. Four 
perspectives might be conceptualized in this regard, as shown in the following table. 
Luhmann (1979) argues that anyone who refuses to confer trust will be burdened 
with the complexity of entirely contingent situations, which places so many demands 
on the individual that it renders him incapable of action. Trust is therefore functional 
to enable action and cooperation in contingent environments because it enables 
‘suspension’ of risk (Möllering, 2006). This suspension of risk is an important 
functional factor for successful collaboration because it allows actors  to focus on 
achieving project goals instead of on developing the details of the partnership (Shaw, 
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2003). As such, interorganizational trust allows to overcome some “considerable 
barriers of collective inertia” (Agranoff, 2013, p.  194).  
Table 2: Role of interorganizational trust and distrust in public administration 
(conceptualization) 
 Trust Distrust 
‘F
un
ct
io
na
l’ 
 
Suspension of risk leads to increased 
cooperation, flexibility, innovation, learning, 
goal-orientation, performance and pro-social 
behavior, which is argued to result in 
unpredictable but potential gains and cost-
efficiency 
 
 
Active avoidance of risk inspires atomization, 
regulation and behavioral control, which protect 
actors against possible abuse of their 
vulnerability, which is argued to result in 
predictable (but high) transaction costs and 
predictable (but low) gains 
 
‘D
ys
fu
nc
tio
na
l’  
Suspension of risk leads to possible abuse 
of vulnerability in case of opportunism and 
blindness to failure, which is argued to result 
in unpredictable potential costs 
 
 
Active avoidance of risk inspires atomization, 
regulation and behavioral control, which is 
argued to lead to foregone opportunities and 
associated high opportunity costs 
 
 
However, distrust also enables action in contingent environments on the basis of 
assumed likely contingencies, and is therefore considered to be the major “functional 
equivalent” of trust (Luhmann, 1979; Lewis & Weigert, 1987). The functional 
equivalence between trust and distrust is explained by Hardin (2002, p.  95) in his 
argument that “if I either trust or distrust you, I have fairly clear grounds on which to 
act towards you”. While trust is associated to collaborative action due to intentional 
and behavioral suspension of vulnerability, distrust is associated to atomized action 
due to the intentional and behavioral avoidance of vulnerability, in which actors either 
withdraw from interactions or rely on an array of strategies to constrain contingency, 
risk and vulnerability. Such distrust-inspired strategies are considered functional in a 
world of untrustworthy partners, while analogously, to trust can be considered to be 
the most functional strategy in a world of trustworthy partners (Hardin, 2002).  
While distrust produces a predictable and regular aggregate of lost opportunities and 
related opportunity costs of foregone cooperation (Hardin, 2002), trust reduces the 
transaction costs of collaborative action but also creates unpredictable and irregular 
gains and costs where it is misplaced. This consideration led Nooteboom (2006) to 
argue that the extrinsic value of trust lies in the economic value it generates. Trust 
can reduce experienced system complexity at far lesser costs because vulnerability 
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is suspended, while distrust requires costly control- and enforcement-intensive 
strategies to actively avoid vulnerability (Bromily & Harris, 2006; Cummings & 
Bromily, 1996; Zaheer, McEvily & Perrone, 1998). A large body of research on the 
societal, organizational, and interpersonal level has illustrated that the suspension of 
vulnerability in trust-intensive environments leads to a range of functional 
consequences such as increased innovation, learning, organizational performance, 
and effective cooperation (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). We 
therefore argue that the major functionality of trust lies in its potential for cost-
effective goal-oriented collaboration, which is a very important virtue in public 
administration, where efficiency of goal realization is considered to be the primary 
criterion of administrative rationality (Simon, 1997).  
But it is also true that interorganizational trust is not always functional and distrust is 
not always dysfunctional. Too much trust might lead to the vehement defense of 
inefficient, ineffective or even downright counterproductive interorganizational 
cooperation (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Granovetter (1985) argued that too much 
trust allows lawlessness, non-accountability and corruption. Trust can “bind and 
blind” (McEvily, Perrone & Zaheer, 2003, p.  98), and provide ample opportunity for 
abuse.  
Table 3 illustrates this discussion with an empirical exploration of the functionalities 
and dysfunctionalities of interorganizational trust and distrust in Flemish public 
administration. The exploration is based on interviews with nine Flemish Senior Civil 
Servants regarding their experiences with positive and negative outcomes of 
interorganizational trust in the Flemish regional administration, and therefore reflects 
our conceptual discussion in the practical experiences of senior administrators, who 
are searching for more and better interorganizational cooperation to deal with 
complex policy challenges under constant public pressure to “do more with less”. 
This pressure is felt by all sectors of the economy and encourages the creation of 
alliances (Shaw, 2003) and stresses the functional value of interorganizational trust 
in Flemish public administration. 
 
13 
 
Table 3: Role of interorganizational trust and distrust in Flemish administration 
(exploration) 
 Trust Distrust 
‘F
un
ct
io
na
l’ 
Exploratory interviews  
- Sine qua non condition for collaborative 
action 
! Allows efficient and effective cooperation 
! Allows open communication 
! Allows more flexible cooperation 
Exploratory interviews  
! Allows maintaining critical perspective in 
cooperation 
! Allows identification of conflicting objectives in 
cooperation 
! Enables constructive criticism and innovation 
 
‘D
ys
fu
nc
tio
na
l’ Exploratory interviews  
! Might lead to ‘groupthink’ 
! Can bring comparative disadvantages in 
high-risk contexts on the short term for 
organizations 
 
Exploratory interviews  
! Active obstruction and atomization instead of 
collaboration  
! Involves opportunity costs of avoiding non-
effectuated contingencies 
! Involves relational deterioration 
 
 
On the basis of these insights, we argue that interorganizational trust can indeed be 
functional in public administration, but note that researchers and reformers need to 
avoid presenting it as an “applause concept” that is always and everywhere 
beneficial for public administration (Van Montfort, 2010). Both trust and distrust can 
be desirable assets in public administration as long as they provide social value, but 
neither is desirable or undesirable in and of itself (Beccerra & Gupta, 1999). While 
our consideration of the functionalities and dysfunctionalities of trust and distrust 
provides reasons to choose for one over the other, it does not imply a value 
judgment regarding the extent to which trust and distrust ought to be present in 
public administration. Moore (1903) argued that it is a naturalistic fallacy to derive 
moral conclusions from factual premises: an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is”. 
A moral choice for distrust stresses the functionality of predictable costs of risk 
avoidance strategies, but accepts that the opportunity- and transaction costs of such 
strategies are relatively high. A moral choice for trust stresses functionalities such as 
unpredictable gains, while it accepts the possibility of unpredictable costs when 
vulnerability is abused and actors become blind to failure. Researchers can therefore 
identify whether and when interorganizational trust or distrust have certain functional 
and dysfunctional consequences in public administration, but the moral choice 
regarding how the distribution of trust and distrust ought to be should be left to the 
discretion of autonomous moral faculties, such as democratically elected decision-
makers.  
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2.4. Distribution of trust and distrust 
Some authors have argued that trust and distrust do not only have distinct roles, but 
are distinct (albeit related) phenomena entirely (Luhmann, 1979; Hardin, 2002; 
Lewicki, McAllister & Bies, 1998). We discuss this notion and its implications in this 
paragraph. 
Lewicki et al. (1998) argue that actors in complex interactions can have 
multidimensional attitudinal valences. In other words: actors might trust each other 
with respect to some aspects of the relation but distrust each other regarding other 
aspects. This perspective calls for clear definitions of trust and distrust as distinct 
phenomena. While we have defined trust as “the intentional and behavioral 
suspension of vulnerability by a trustor on the basis of positive expectations of a 
trustee”, we define distrust as “the intentional and behavioral rejection of vulnerability 
by a trustor on the basis of negative expectations of a trustee”.  
Some authors have argued that the presence of trust does not imply the absence of 
distrust, as both phenomena result from different antecedents. For instance, Sitkin 
and Roth (1993) argue that distrust is grounded predominantly in value congruence, 
while trust is grounded mainly in the context- specific reliable execution of tasks. On 
the basis of this consideration, they argue that legalistic 'remedies' are appropriate to 
build trust while they are inappropriate to reduce distrust. Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt and 
Camerer (1998, p.  399) argue that “belief in the absence of “negative intentions” is 
not the same as belief in the presence of positive intentions – the latter being a 
necessary condition of the generally accepted definition of trust”. Furthermore, 
Zucker suggests that disruptions of trust arise when either ‘background expectations’ 
(common world understandings) or ‘constitutive expectations’ (context-specific 
understandings) are violated. However, this does not necessarily involve more 
distrust, as "distrust only emerges when the suspicion arises that the disruption of 
expectations in one exchange is likely to generalize to other ... interactions or 
exchanges, at least of a particular type" (Zucker, 1986, p.  59).  
Besides the argument that trust and distrust have different antecedents, some 
scholars argue that they are distinct concepts because they have different 
characteristics. Lewicki et al. (1998) argue that the continuum of trust is associated 
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with hope, faith, confidence, assurance and initiative, while the continuum of distrust 
is associated with fear, skepticism, cynicism, wariness, watchfulness and vigilance. 
As such, a separate conceptualization of trust and distrust yields four ‘ideal type’ 
distributions of trust and distrust that are associated with different characteristics of 
relations between actors.  
A first distribution is that of high trust and low distrust. Under such a distribution, the 
trustor is confident and does not suspect the trustee. This situation is expected to 
result in many rich and intense cooperative relationships that create social capital 
and relational initiative, identification with each other’s values, verbalization of 
positive appreciation and support (McAllister, 1995), relational repair after conflicts 
and even the invocation of defense mechanisms when confronted with evidence that 
a trustee might be untrustworthy (Lewicki et al.  1998). Relationships characterized 
by such a balance are considered to be resilient and sustainable because of the 
thick trust (Nooteboom, 2006) that grounds them. 
The second distribution is dominated by distrust while trust is relatively absent. In 
such a situation, the trustor has no intention to position himself in a vulnerable way 
and is extremely wary and watchful for damaging actions of the ‘trustee’. 
Cooperation is avoided when possible. Where cooperation is unavoidable, the 
distrustor makes significant investments to constrain and steer the distrusted and 
make himself as invulnerable to any action of the distrusted as possible. 
Interorganizational cooperation under this social reality is characterized by pre-
emption, deterrence (Rousseau et al., 1998), continuous monitoring, checking, 
control (Lewicki et al. 1998) and the exertion of power and coercion (Bachmann, 
2001).  
The third distribution presents a situation in which low trust and low distrust occur 
simultaneously. Here, actors in a transaction have no reason to be particularly 
confident or wary, nor do they have a strong tendency to disengage or engage in any 
interaction (Lewicki et al. 1998). They are neither particularly willing nor unwilling to 
be vulnerable. Furthermore, the absence of interactions leads to a low production of 
relational information, resulting in a lack of ‘good reasons’ for actors to change their 
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attitudes. This distribution is therefore relatively stable as long as interaction remains 
absent.  
Finally, the fourth distribution is characterized by both high extents of trust and high 
extents of distrust. Trustors are confident about some facets of their relationship with 
a trustee while they are suspicious about other facets at the same time. Actors in a 
relationship have both common and competing objectives that can potentially 
conflict. While this distribution might seem counter-intuitive, Lewicki et al. (1998) 
argue that it is actually the most prevalent position for sustained working 
relationships in modern, complex organizations. It might be expected that actors in 
this position are very apt to make calculations of the costs and benefits of 
cooperation and exchange (Rousseau et al., 1998). Exploratory interviews with 
Senior Civil Servants in the Flemish public administration yielded some interesting 
examples of this distribution. One of our respondents illustrated this distribution with 
a situation in which they and their colleagues play both administrative and political 
roles. It therefore seems that this position might also be prevalent (or even typical) in 
public administration contexts. 
“Because you have the distrust in the political level and the trust in civil servants. But 
they are in turn steered by the political level, so distrust plays again, or the other way 
around. So you constantly have the political and the administrative level and the 
duality between trust and distrust.” 
Although the theory of four distinct distributions of trust and distrust is over ten years 
old, efforts to measure them as separate constructs have lagged (Lewicki & 
Brinsfield, 2011). However, a fundamental discussion of complex interorganizational 
interactions requires researchers to define trust and distrust clearly, identify the 
distribution in specific relationships while taking into account the extant context-
specific tensions and pressures, and study the dynamics between the particular 
sources and consequences of trust and distrust. In the following paragraph, we 
consider how trust and distrust are expressed on the (inter)organizational level, and 
which sources may influence such organization-level trust and distrust. 
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2.5. The organizational nature of trust and distrust in public administration 
Zaheer et al. (1998, p. 142) defined interorganizational trust as “the extent of trust 
placed in the partner organization by the members of a focal organization”. 
Interorganizational relations are not faceless, because they are actively handled and 
managed by individuals operating in the institutional and cultural framework of their 
organizations. Trust can therefore be considered to be ‘organizational’ when certain 
mandated individuals act on behalf of their organization in a certain interaction. In the 
literature, these individuals are often specified as ‘boundary spanners’ (Aldrich & 
Herker, 1977; Currall & Judge, 1995; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Zaheer et al. 1998; 
Perrone, Zaheer & McEvily, 2003). 
Boundary spanning civil servants are argued to have a “dual personality” due to 
organizational socialization. Barnard (1938, p.  188 cited in Simon, 1997, p.  283) 
argues that this dual personality consists of a private personality and an 
organizational personality, which is mainly determined by organizational demands of 
efficiency. Therefore, the professional decisions made by boundary spanners are 
different from the decisions they would make in their personal lives. However, Simon 
(1997) argues that “personal motives reassert themselves” in areas that require 
discretionary behavior from the individual civil servant (Simon, 1997, p.  283). 
Interorganizational administrative behavior therefore has a personal and an 
organizational dimension because it is professed through individual boundary 
spanning civil servants. In complex interorganizational interactions, these boundary 
spanners’ individual subjective evaluations build on their personal and organizational 
considerations, and are therefore the basis of interorganizational trust (Beccerra & 
Gupta, 1999). Interestingly, the exemplary quote we used to describe the high 
trust/high distrust distribution suggests that in public administration, a third ‘political’ 
personality could also play in these subjective evaluations of organizational 
boundary spanners.  
Choudhury (2008) argues that trust is a relational orientation that is embedded and 
enacted in organizational structures, procedures and institutions. From this, he infers 
that trust is a social fact in organizations rather than a characteristic of individuals. 
The organizational nature of interorganizational trust therefore lies in the personal, 
institutional, and interaction-specific characteristics that affect the subjective 
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evaluations that boundary spanners make about trust in their counterpart 
organizations. 
Therefore, the analysis of trust and distrust as (inter)organizational notions requires 
us to take into account how interaction characteristics on three levels influence 
boundary spanner’s subjective evaluations regarding trust and distrust: the macro-
level of socializing institutional arrangements, the meso-level of concrete interaction 
characteristics, and the micro-level of specific individual characteristics (Beccerra & 
Gupta, 1999; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Zaheer et al. 1998; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). 
We elaborate on these sources in the following paragraph. 
2.6. The sources of interorganizational trust and distrust 
The growing literature on trust has resulted in many typologies of sources of trust. 
The following table presents a comprehensive overview of relevant typologies.  
Table 4: Different perspectives on the sources of trust  
Author Trust bases Description 
Zucker (1986) 
Cited: 3118 
Process-based 
 
Developed through repeated interactions where a credible reputation 
evolves 
Characteristic-
based 
Tied to the identity of a person or organization, with shared values, beliefs, 
race, gender, family, etc. 
Institution-based Based on the existence of formal organizations with responsibility for professional, business and/or government regulation 
Sako (1992) 
Cited: 1611 
Contractual Built on shared moral norms of honesty and promise-keeping 
Competence 
 
Shared understanding between parties of appropriate professional 
conduct and acceptable technical and managerial standards 
Goodwill Based on an understanding among parties about what is fair in their transaction 
Shapiro, 
Sheppard & 
Cherakin (1992) 
Cited: 704 
 
Deterrence-based Developed through repeated interactions where the reputation of the firm is held hostage 
Knowledge-based 
 
Developed through knowledge about the other party, resulting from 
communication and the development of personal relationships that 
produce dependability 
Identification-
based 
One party in the transaction fully internalizes the preferences of the other 
party, foregoing opportunism 
McAllister (1995) 
Cited: 3372 
Affect-based Grounded in reciprocated interpersonal care and concern 
Cognition-based Grounded in individual beliefs about peer reliability and dependability 
Lewicki & Bunker 
(1996) 
Cited: 1792 
Calculus-based 
 
Trust is on on-going economic calculation whose value is derived by 
determining the outcomes resulting from creating and sustaining the 
relationship relative to the costs of maintaining or severing it. 
Knowledge-based Trust is based on information and knowledge about the other party as a result of communication and personal relationships 
Identification-
based 
Trust is based on effective understanding and appreciation of the other’s 
wants, and this mutual understanding is developed to the point where 
each can effectively act for the other. 
Rousseau, Sitkin, 
Burt & Camerer 
(1998) 
Cited: 3872 
(Deterrence-
based) 
Utilitarian considerations that another will act trustworthily because of fear 
of sanctions that accompany violation of trust (the authors clarify that they 
do not consider this to be a source of actual trust) 
Institution-based Organizational and cultural supports (e.g. legal systems) produce confidence that vulnerability in an exchange will not be exploited. 
Calculus-based Trust is developed when one of the parties in an exchange perceives that the other party intends to perform in a beneficial manner 
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Relation-based Repeated interactions between agents over time produce positive expectations concerning the reliability and dependability of the party 
Kramer (1999) 
Cited: 1737 
Dispositional 
 
As expectancies are generalized, people acquire a diffuse expectancy for 
trust of others that eventually assumes the form of a relatively stable 
personality characteristic. 
History-based 
 
Is predicated on interactional histories that give decision makers useful 
information in assessing others’ dispositions, intentions, and motives, 
providing a basis for inferences regarding future behavior. 
Third-party based Third parties diffuse trust-relevant information via gossip, which constitutes a valuable source of “second-hand” knowledge about others. 
Category- based Is predicated on information regarding a trustee’s membership in a social or organizational category. 
Role-based 
 
Is predicated on knowledge that a person occupies a particular role in the 
organization rather than specific knowledge about the person’s 
capabilities, dispositions, motives, and intentions. 
Rule-based 
 
Is predicated not on a conscious calculation of consequences, but rather 
on shared understandings regarding the system of rules regarding 
appropriate behavior. 
(Adapted based on Wilson, 2005; Citation numbers from Google Scholar on 1 March 
2013) 
We will use the framework developed by Rousseau et al. (1998) as a point of 
reference for our further discussion because their article is seminal in the body of 
literature on trust, as exemplified in its extensive citation record. Second, their 
framework is most suitable to analyze an organizational notion of trust because it 
allows a discussion of sources on the three levels of interorganizational interactions 
that influence boundary spanner’s subjective evaluations. Third, their framework is 
flexible enough to incorporate the perspectives of other authors and can also be 
applied to analyze the sources of interorganizational distrust, allowing researchers to 
compare the sources of both concepts.  
2.6.1. The macro-level: institution-based trust 
Macro-level sources of trust and distrust are the institutional characteristics that 
encompass concrete interorganizational interactions. It is often argued that 
institutional arrangements can act both as supports or impediments to trust (Zucker, 
1986; Bachmann & Zaheer, 2008; Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; Rousseau, 1998). 
Institution-based trust entails that a trustor’s subjective evaluation of trust or distrust 
in a trustee are embedded in “internal organizing principles and practices” (Perrone 
et al., 2003, p.  428) that encompass the interaction. Institution-based trust is argued 
to play an important role in large and fragmented organizations because it forms a 
bridge between unfamiliar actors (Sydow, 2006) by establishing a ‘world in common’ 
(Zucker, 1986) through formal and informal norms of behavior. In public 
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administration, where spatial and social distances can be of considerable magnitude, 
institution-based trust could therefore be an important driver of trust and distrust. 
Institutions can establish trust rather directly or more subtly through socialization of 
boundary spanners. Whereas formal institutions such as rules and role definitions 
can socialize boundary spanners through coercive isomorphism, informal institutions 
such as organizational routines and dominant normative frameworks work through 
mimetic and normative isomorphic mechanisms (Dimaggio & Powell, 1983). As such, 
both formal and informal institutions can bridge unfamiliarity in the decision to trust or 
refrain from doing so and shape actor behavior along the lines of institutionally 
provided templates (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011). Rules rest on shared 
understandings regarding appropriate behavior and are a potent organizational 
resource to facilitate coordination and cooperation (Kramer, 1999). Roles can 
allowing boundary spanners to adopt trust even in the absence of personalized 
knowledge, on the basis of common knowledge regarding barriers to entry into roles, 
presumptions of training and socialization processes that role occupants undergo, 
and perceptions of the accountability mechanisms that ensure role compliance 
(Kramer, 1999). Informal institutions such as organizational routines can establish 
trust because they can lead to a taken-for-granted attitude of mutual trust between 
organizations. Finally, the perceived normative frameworks of peers or leaders might 
establish an organizational “culture of trustfulness” (Sztompka, 1998) as a typical 
group orientation, exerting pressure on the individual actor’s subjective evaluation.  
2.6.2. The meso-level: relations and calculus 
While institutions impact trustor boundary spanner’s subjective evaluations through 
the formation of  institutional “bridges” between unfamiliar actors (Sydow, 2006), the 
meso-level trust sources refer to relation-specific familiarity, information, 
characteristics and dynamics. On this level, we consider calculative and relational 
sources of trust (Rousseau et al., 1998).   
The idea of calculus-based trust presents trust as a utilitarian strategy in which 
trustors rationally weigh the costs and benefits of certain courses of action in 
interactive settings on the basis of incomplete and asymmetric information about the 
trustee with the aim of maximizing their individual utility. Calculus-based trust 
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therefore rests on the trustor’s utility function and on the availability of credible 
(asymmetrical) information about the trustee’s trustworthiness in the relation (Lewicki 
& Bunker, 1996). Such credible sources of information might be found in the relation 
with the trustee (for instance the revealed preferences of the trustee), in third parties 
statements about the trustee, in the trustee’s reputation, or in institutional sources 
(for instance performance reports, organizational audits, etc.). This calculative 
perspective is very prominent in Hardin’s (2001) work on trust as an ‘encapsulated 
interest’, in which it is argued that trust is placed in an actor when it is perceived that 
that actor has an interest in continuing a certain relationship. The calculative source 
stresses the cognitive nature of trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985), which is discussed by 
other scholars as knowledge- based trust (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996), cognition-based 
trust (McAllister, 1995), or third party based trust (Kramer, 1999).  
However, some scholars argue that trust cannot be explained by calculative 
decisions alone (Lyon, Möllering & Saunders, 2011). Trust is argued to also stem 
from relational sources, which are based on repeated interactions between actors 
and on reciprocated interpersonal care and concern, which leads to the formation of 
emotional attachments (Rousseau et al., 1998). Shaw (2003) argues that good 
interpersonal relationships contribute to the level of trust in non-profit partnerships. 
Value identification between parties and mutual experience with the historical 
development of a relation are important components of these relational sources, 
which rest on personal and historical familiarity (Rousseau et al., 1998). These 
sources are slowly established, strengthened and expanded as a result of repeated 
experiences with interaction in risky and uncertain environments. Relation-based 
trust and distrust is also argued to be more emotional (Lewis & Weigert, 1985), and 
related conceptualizations suggested by other authors are affection-based trust 
(McAllister, 1995) and identity-based trust (Lewicki & Buncker, 1996; Shapiro, 
Sheppard & Cherakin, 1992).  
It is important to note that these sources are not completely independent from each 
other. The potential for both calculative and relational considerations might depend 
on the institutional framework encompassing interorganizational interactions. For 
instance, actor objectives or values might be institutionally determined in their roles, 
thereby possibly influencing relational trust between boundary spanners. The 
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calculus considerations can depend on information gathered by institutional 
mechanisms such as audit or control bodies, or the presence of incentive structures 
that influence actors’ individual utility functions. Therefore, sufficient attention is 
needed for the institutional background of meso-level sources of interorganizational 
trust and distrust. 
2.6.3. The micro level: individual predispositions 
Finally, it is argued that boundary spanners’ subjective evaluations are also 
influenced by their own individual trusting or distrusting predispositions (Rotter, 
1967). These dispositions are considered to represent a general tendency of focal 
actors to trust or distrust others regardless of the situation, interaction or relation, 
meaning that they constitute a generally stable individual trait of ‘willingness to trust 
others’ (Frazier, Johnson & Fainshmidt, 2013). They are presented as psychological 
traits of individuals (Sztompka, 1998) which result from of a “wide-ranging 
summation of past experience in more localized domains” (Glanville &  Paxton, 
2007, p.  232), and are also referred to as individual trustfulness (Sztompka, 1998), 
dispositional trust (McKnight, Cummings & Chervany, 1998), or individual propensity 
to trust (Mayer et al., 1995).  
3. Consolidation: studying ‘administrational’ trust  
In our discussion of interorganizational trust, we have addressed a gap in the 
existing public administration literature.  
Trust is defined as “the intentional and behavioral suspension of vulnerability by a 
trustor on the basis of positive expectations of a trustee”, and distrust as “the 
intentional and behavioral rejection of vulnerability by a trustor on the basis of 
negative expectations of a trustee”. We have presented all the necessary building 
blocks to define ‘administrational trust and distrust’ as a crucial but currently 
understudied research topic in public administration. The prefix ‘administrational’ is a 
contraction of the words ‘organizational’ and ‘administrative’. On the one hand, this 
prefix designates an organizational notion of trust (and distrust), which stresses the 
subjective evaluations of organizational boundary spanners concerning three 
dimensions of trust, on the basis of sources that lie in three levels of 
interorganizational interactions: the micro level refers to the attitudinal 
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predispositions of these boundary spanners, the meso level refers to calculative and 
relational characteristics in interactions between boundary spanners, and the macro 
level refers to formal and informal institutions surrounding the interorganizational 
interaction. On the other hand, it highlights the administrative context of our study, as 
studies directed at a better understanding of interorganizational trust and distrust 
need to take the specificities of their particular context into account.  While trust 
relates to a general attitude of groups towards an abstract object in its most diffuse 
form (Uslaner, 2011),  more contextualized ‘specific’ operationalizations require the 
object, subject, context and situation of interorganizational trust to be defined as 
clear as possible (Nooteboom, 2002, p.  259). Therefore, we define ‘administrational 
trust’ as “a subjective evaluation made by boundary spanners regarding their 
intentional and behavioral suspension of vulnerability on the basis of their 
expectations of a trustee organization in particular interorganizational interactions in 
public administration.” 
Our discussion is consolidated in a comprehensive analytical framework, which can 
be used as a guide for researchers that have the ambition to fill this gap in public 
administration research. The framework allows examination of the mechanisms of 
administrational trust and distrust. As illustrated in table 5, these mechanisms consist 
of seven sources on three levels of interorganizational interactions, which influence 
boundary spanners’ evaluations concerning three dimensions of trust and distrust. 
To that extent, the framework depicts our attempt to clear a path through the 
“conceptual morass” that resulted from the accumulation of previous 
conceptualizations of (interorganizational) trust, and lays the foundations of more 
comprehensive analyses of administrative systems’ capacity to develop  
‘administrational’ trust and distrust.  
First, the framework brings added analytical value because it conceptualizes trust 
and distrust as two potentially different constructs. As such, researchers can use this 
framework to examine whether and to which extent interorganizational trust and 
distrust exist separately, simultaneously, or not at all in a range of interactions that 
are central to public administration. 
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Second, it conceptualizes three distinct dimensions of administrational trust ánd 
distrust. As such, the framework allows researchers to examine whether different 
dynamics exist within or between the three dimensions of both subjective 
evaluations, allowing attention for the potential emersion of self-reinforcing virtuous 
or vicious cycles of administrational trust and distrust. 
Third, the framework is useful for analysis of the mechanisms of administrational 
trust and distrust because it identifies seven categories of ‘sources’ on three levels of 
interactions which might impact boundary spanners’ subjective evaluations regarding 
the three dimensions of trust and distrust. It shows how subjective evaluations of the 
three dimensions of trust and distrust are influenced by characteristics of rules, roles, 
routines and dominant normative frameworks on the macro-level, by interaction-
specific calculative and relational characteristics on the meso-level, and by individual 
predispositions on the micro-level of interorganizational interactions. As such, the 
framework allows researchers to identify and examine the mechanisms that lie at the 
basis of administrative systems’ capacity for administrational trust and distrust. A 
comparison of columns in the framework permits an answer to the question of how 
singular sources impact subjective evaluations of the three dimensions (for instance, 
how do role definitions in a particular interorganizational interaction influence 
boundary spanners’ evaluations in all three dimensions of administrational trust and 
distrust?), while a comparison of the horizontal rows answers the question as to how 
subjective evaluations of each singular dimension are impacted by multiple sources 
of administrational trust and distrust (for instance: how are trustor boundary 
spanners’ perceptions of trustworthiness influenced by the framework of rules, roles, 
interpersonal relationships, etc.).  
In its entirety, the framework therefore captures much of the complexity of 
administrational trust and distrust. It allows researchers to compare weaknesses and 
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Table 5: Analytical framework of sources of administrational trust and distrust 
 
 
Formal institutions Informal institutions Interactions Personal  
 Rules Roles Routines Normative framework Calculus Relations Disposition  
Tr
us
t 
(Perceived) 
trustworthiness 
(How) do rules 
support positive 
expectations? 
(How) do roles 
support positive 
expectations? 
(How) do 
routines support 
positive 
expectations? 
(How) do normative 
frameworks 
support positive 
expectations? 
(How) does utility 
maximization 
support positive 
expectations? 
(How) do 
relations support 
positive 
expectations? 
(How) do 
dispositions 
support positive 
expectations? 
Sources of 
perceived 
trustworthiness  
Intended 
suspension of 
vulnerability 
(How) do rules 
support actors’ 
willingness to be 
vulnerable? 
(How) do roles 
support actors’ 
willingness to be 
vulnerable? 
(How) do 
routines support 
actors’ 
willingness to be 
vulnerable? 
(How) do normative 
frameworks 
support actors’ 
willingness to be 
vulnerable? 
(How) does utility 
maximization 
support actors’ 
willingness to be 
vulnerable? 
(How) do 
relations support 
actors’ 
willingness to be 
vulnerable? 
(How) do 
dispositions 
support actors’ 
willingness to be 
vulnerable? 
Sources of 
intended 
suspension of 
vulnerability  
Behavioral trust 
(How) do rules 
support actors’ 
risk-taking 
behavior? 
(How) do roles 
support actors’ 
risk-taking 
behavior? 
(How) do 
routines support 
actors’ risk-
taking behavior? 
(How) do normative 
frameworks 
support actors’ risk-
taking behavior? 
(How) does utility 
maximization 
support actors’ risk-
taking behavior? 
(How) do 
relations support 
actors’ risk-
taking behavior? 
(How) do 
dispositions 
support actors’ 
risk-taking 
behavior? 
Sources of 
behavioral trust  
D
is
tr
us
t  
(Perceived) 
untrustworthiness 
(How) do rules 
support negative 
expectations? 
(How) do roles 
support negative 
expectations? 
(How) do 
routines support 
negative 
expectations? 
(How) do normative 
frameworks 
support negative 
expectations? 
(How) does utility 
maximization 
support negative 
expectations? 
(How) do 
relations support 
negative 
expectations? 
(How) do 
dispositions 
support negative 
expectations? 
Sources of 
perceived 
untrustworthiness  
Intended rejection 
of vulnerability 
(How) do rules 
support actors’ 
intention to reject 
vulnerability? 
(How) do roles 
support actors’ 
intention to reject 
vulnerability? 
(How) do 
routines support 
actors’ intention 
to reject 
vulnerability? 
(How) do normative 
frameworks 
support actors’ 
intention to reject 
vulnerability? 
(How) does utility 
maximization 
support actors’ 
intention to reject 
vulnerability? 
(How) do 
relations support 
actors’ intention 
to reject 
vulnerability? 
(How) do 
dispositions 
support actors’ 
intention to reject 
vulnerability? 
Sources of 
intended rejection 
of vulnerability 
Behavioral distrust 
(How) do rules 
support actors’ 
risk-avoiding 
behavior? 
(How) do roles 
support actors’ 
risk-avoiding 
behavior? 
(How) do 
routines support 
actors’ risk- 
avoiding 
behavior? 
(How) do normative 
frameworks 
support actors’ risk- 
avoiding behavior? 
(How) does utility 
maximization 
support actors’ risk- 
avoiding behavior? 
(How) do 
relations support 
actors’ risk- 
avoiding 
behavior? 
(How) do 
dispositions 
support actors’ 
risk- avoiding 
behavior? 
Sources of 
behavioral distrust  
  
Institutional 
regulatory 
sources of 
adm. trust and 
distrust 
Institutional 
role sources 
of adm. trust 
and distrust 
Institutional 
routine 
sources of 
adm. trust and 
distrust 
Institutional 
normative 
sources of adm. 
trust and 
distrust 
Interactive 
calculative 
sources of adm. 
trust and 
distrust 
Interactive 
relational 
sources of 
adm. trust and 
distrust 
Personal 
sources of adm. 
trust and 
distrust 
Sources of 
administrational 
trust and distrust 
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strengths of different interorganizational regimes regarding their capacity to generate 
administrational trust and/or distrust. Furthermore, it allows reformers and public 
managers to formulate specific managerial strategies to optimize the administrational 
trust-distrust distribution. In addition to its analytical value, the framework therefore 
also has practical value for public sector reformers, who can apply it as the 
framework for development of an integrated strategy to manage administrational trust 
and distrust which takes into account that strategies directed at supporting trust in 
one cell of the framework might have positive or negative side-effects in another cell 
of the framework. Furthermore, the framework allows them to take into account that 
strategies that aim to support administrational trust might differ from strategies that 
are directed at the reduction of administrational distrust. The framework comes with 
one major disclaimer for both reformers and researchers: preferences and decisions 
regarding the distribution of administrational trust and distrust are normative 
positions, as both trust and distrust bring functionalities and dysfunctionalities into 
interorganizational collaborative environments that may or may not have some 
ideological connotations in political environments such as public administration.  
4. Conclusion 
We argued that interorganizational trust in public administration is a crucial but 
currently understudied topic in public administration research. We therefore 
presented an overview of the rich literature regarding trust and discussed the 
concepts that are central to the study of interorganizational trust and distrust in public 
administration, which we have conceptualized as ‘administrational trust’. The 
conceptual discussion we presented can serve as a signpost in the conceptual 
morass that is trust research. We have argued that both administrational trust and 
distrust can be considered to have certain functionalities and dysfunctionalities, and 
that any judgment regarding which is ‘better’ is therefore a moral choice that should 
be left to autonomous moral decision-makers. We also suggested to define the 
concept of ‘administrational trust’ as  “a subjective evaluation made by boundary 
spanners regarding their intentional and behavioral suspension of vulnerability on the 
basis of their expectations of a trustee organization in particular interorganizational 
interactions in public administration”, and presented an analytical framework that 
allows researchers and managerial professionals to study the mechanisms that 
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underlie administrational trust and distrust empirically, on the basis of which 
strategies for optimization might be developed to facilitate, solidify and increase the 
performance of interorganizational cooperation in public administration. While the 
usefulness of the analytical framework is ultimately assessed in its future empirical 
application, we argue that this article makes a contribution to the existing literature by 
providing a canvass for theory, research and managerial strategies of 
administrational trust and distrust, and that it can therefore support public 
administration to build the self-confidence it needs to provide better services and 
ultimately strengthen the trust it receives from the society it intends to serve. 
  
28 
 
5. Notes 
1. The authors want to thank prof. Dr. Chris Skelcher, prof. Dr. Montgomery van 
Wart, prof. Dr. Koen Verhoest, Prof. Dr. Jeroen Maesschalk, Dr. Joery Matthys, 
Marloes Callens and the anonymous reviewers for their comments and 
suggestions on earlier versions of this article.  
2. Our reference to the pressure on Flemish Civil Servants to “do more with less” 
is not without reason. In fact; “do more with less” is one of the four strategic 
goals in the “Multiannual Program Decisive Government”, the current major 
public management reform program in Flanders.  
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